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Third Paper.
THE AMERICAN CASES ON CONTRACTS CONTAINING AN
OPTION.
The first paper' dealt with the existence in England in
the eighteenth century of the idea that equity, in order to
enforce a contract, required a mutuality of obligation that
does not exist in contracts containing an option. The second
paper2 traced the total disappearance of this idea in England.
Cases like Bromley v. Jefferies,3 which denied specific per-
formance to the plaintiff, who had given a good considera-
tion for an option to purchase land, are no longer law;
Lawrenson v. Butler,4 in which Lord Redesdale expressed
the same idea, is regarded as an overruled case, containing
' May number, supra, page 270.
" July number, su pra, page -.
32 Vern. 430, 1700.
4I Sch. & Lef. 13, 1802.
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obsolete dicta on the Statute of Frauds. In England the
defense of lack of mutuality, as a special defence defeating
a plaintiff's right to specific performance, is confined to lack
of mutuality in the remedy of the parties in equity, and has
no longer anything to do with a peculiar lack of mutuality
in the obligations in the contract itself. In America, how-
ever, the effect of the eighteenth-century idea of the meaning
of the defence has had, and, we shall see, is still having, an
influence on our decisions. 5 This is probably due to the fact
that leases with options to renew have always been prac-
tically unknown in the United States. A lease with an
option to purchase is now quite common. In the early part
of the nineteenth century, if we can draw a conclusion from
the paucity of reported cases, such leases were comparatively
rare. Reference to the second paper will show that it was
from the lease with an option to renew that we have in
England, the modern rule giving specific performance in all
cases of contracts containing an option. Thus an important
factor there, making towards the abolition of the old idea
of lack of mutuality in the obligation as a defence, was
wanting, or rather was much less of a force, in the United
States.
Another fact tending to perpetuate the old idea of lack of
mutuality in this country was the prevalence among the pro-
fession, in the first part of the nineteenth century, of two
English works, Schoales and Lefroy's Reports, and Newlin
on Contracts. The former contained the opinion of Lord
Redesdale in Lawrenson v. Butler. This opinion, which was
examined in the first paper, contained, besides refer-
encesinthenotestoBroinley v. Jefferies, and other eighteenth-
century cases dealing with lack of mutuality in the obliga-
tion as a special defence in equity, this sentence: "I confess
I have no conception that a court of equity ought to decree
'.Bromley v. Jefferies and other eighteenth-century cases cited in the
first paper are still used as leading cases on the defence of lack of
mutuality: See for example Pomeroy Spec. 8, sec. 163, note i, ed. of
1897; the American notes to the American edition of Fry on Spec. 8,
page 214. The English notes to this work cite Bromley v. Jefferies, on
page 216, but treat it as a minor case to be referred to under the general
statement "see also," the whole note being in support of the assertion
that there must be mutuality in the remedy.
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a specific performance in a case where nothing has been done
in pursuance of the agreement, except where both parties
had, by the agreement, a right to compel a specific perform-
ance, because otherwise it would follow that the court would
decree a specific performance where the party called upon to
perform might be in this situation, that if the agreement
was disadvantageous to him he would be liable to the per-
formance, and yet if advantageous to him he could not com-
pel a performance."6 Though Lord Redesdale was not deal-
ing with contracts containing an option, his words accurately
expressed the old idea, which prevented specific performance
in such cases. The general use of these reports, and the care
with which they were read by such men as Chancellor Kent,
as his opinions evidence, would have rendered it more than
probable that such a striking sentence would have soon found
its way into American opinions. The general use, how-
ever, of Newlin on Contracts7 seems to have been also an
important factor in increasing the references to the decision
of Lawrenson v. Butler, and the use of the sentence above
quoted. For this author devotes several pages to a discus-
sion of the requirement in equity of mutuality in a contract,
dealing with practically all the eighteenth-century cases
discussed in the first paper, but especially with Lawrenson v.
Butler, the impression left by the writer being, that it is
the principal case.8
In tracing the influence of the eighteenth-century idea of
lack of mutuality in the obligation on optional cases in this
country we shall find that, in practically every case showing
of the effect of that influence, the ultimate source of the prin-
ciples expressed is Lord Redesdale's opinion in Lawrenson
v. Butler, often directly quoted, or introduced through the'
medium of the text-book referred to.
Chancellor Kent introduces the idea of lack of mutuality
'Page 28.
'The edition used was that printed by Win. P. Farrand & Co., Phila-
delphia, ioS. The book is an English work. The English edition, from
which the American was presumably pirated, was issued in i8o6, or
immediately after the decision by Lord Redesdale and before its repudi-
ation by the English courts.
'American edition, i8o8, pages 152 to i56.
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in the obligation as a special defence to specific performance
in two cases: Parkhurst v. Van Cortland9 and Benedict v.
Lynch.'0 The report in both cases is unsatisfactory. In the
first case the court seems to have thought that the plaintiff
had failed to prove any contract signed by the defendant.
Under the Statute of Frauds this failure necessarily defeated
the plaintiff. But the chancellor goes on to say: "It is not
necessary here to insist on another material defect in the
agreement, and that is the want of mutuality, for if the
defendant was bound to sell or lease at the option of the
plaintiffs, the plaintiffs were not bound to elect or take either
* '**and a court of equity will never decree perform-
ance where the remedy is not mutual, or only one party is
bound by the agreement."" For this assertion of the neces-
sity for both parties being bound Chancellor Kent cites
Lawrenson v. Butler, and the eighteenth-century authorities
dealing with mutuality.'"
In the qther case, Benedict v. Lynch, Chancellor Kent
again places his decision on grounds which have nothing
to do with lack of mutuality.'3  He regards the contract
sought to be enforced as having been terminated by the
parties. But again he speaks of lack of mutuality as a
defence, saying: ". . . that a bill for specific perform-
ance will not be sustained if the remedy be not mutual, or
where one party only is bound by the agreement." As in
the former case he uses, in support of this assertion, Law-
9 I Johns. Ch. 273 (N. Y.), 1814.
20i Johns. Ch. 370 (N. Y.), i815.
' Page 282. Note the assertion that the remedy must be mutual, a
year before a similar assertion was first made by an English judge,
Lord Redesdale. See his opinion in Hamilton v. Grant, 3 Dow. 33, i815,
page 42; First Paper, suepra, page 274. Newlin had assumed in i8o6 that
mutuality of remedy was necessary. See American ed., i8o8, page 157,
first paragraph.
12 The case itself does not stand for a positive decision that a contract
containing an option will not be specifically enforced, not only because
the decision was expressly placed on other grounds by the court,
but because it is doubtful whether the option had any consideration to
support it. The option was probably given for a consideration. See
the testimony detailed on page 278, indicating that the option was in a
lease at will.
" It is also doubtful whether the contract rested on a consideration.
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renson v. Butler, together with Bromley v. Jefferies, and
Armiger v. Clark.'4
In the two cases mentioned Chancellor Kent followed
Lord Redesdale in applying the principle above expressed, so
as to defeat the plaintiff's right to specific performance,
where the subject-matter of the contract was land, if the
plaintiff had not signed the contract. Subsequently he felt
compelled to state that he would follow the English courts,
in their repudiation of this idea.1 5  There is no reason to
believe, however, that Chancellor Kent ever regarded a con-
tract in which the plaintiff held an option as enforcible in
equity. Cleason v. Bailey only involved the question
whether a contract relating to the purchase of goods need,
under the Statute of Frauds, be signed by the plaintiff. The
admission that he would grant specific performance where
the defendant only signed the contract is dictum, and in any
event does not throw any light on his opinion in regard to
the specific performance of "optional contracts." Yet, in in
re Hunter,16 where the plaintiff desired to obtain specific
performance of the option to purchase given him in his lease
of the defendant's land, the plaintiff's prayer was granted
on the theory that the opinion in Cleason v. Bailey indicates
that the chancellor had changed his mind on this question.
A later New York case, Woodward v. Harris,17 refers to the
old idea of lack of mutuality, citing Benedict v. Lynch as an
authority for denying specific performance where the plain-
tiff had an option.
Boucher v. Vanbuskirk,'s is the earliest case bearing evi-
dence of the influence of Newlin on Contracts. The plain-
tiff alleged that he had an option in a lease to buy. He
sought a conveyance of the land. Specific performance was
denied, the court saying: "that to enable either party to
compel specific execution, the contract must be mutually
binding on each.' 9 This case was not overruled in Ken-
:'For criticism of this use of Armiger v. Clark to support the idea of
lack of mutuality as a special defence, see First Paper, supra, page 276.
Cleason v. Bailey, 14 Johns. 484 (N. Y.), 1817.
29I Ed. Ch. (N. Y.) i, 1831.
AT2 Barb. 439 (N. Y.), 1848.
"2 A. K. Marsh. 345 (Kty.), 1820.
"The citation is Newlin on Contracts, page 154.
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tucky until I888. In that year it was indirectly decided in
Bank of Louisville v. Baumeister," that an option based on
a consideration was enforcible. The same principle has since
been applied to an option to purchase in a lease.2
As early as 1840 it was decided in Maryland, that an
option to purchase in a lease could be enforced by the lessee.22
The opinion in a later case, Geiger v. Green,23 introduced the
idea that a court will not grant specific performance where
the plaintiff holds an option. The case itself should not, on
the reported facts, be regarded as having anything to do with
the subject, because the option discussed was given without
any consideration, and had been withdrawn by the one party
before the other elected to take.24  Nevertheless the court
treat the original agreement as a contract, and deny specific
performance because of the plaintiff's option. They use the
language of Lord Redesdale which I have quoted, and cite
that case, as well as Bromley v. Tefferies and Boucher v.
Vanbuskirk. In a case arising the next year, Tyson v.
Watts,25 the court, citing Geiger v. Green, again state the
" 87 Kty. 6.
'Bacon v. Kentucky Central Railway Company, 25 S. W. 747 (Kty.),
1894. In this case an attempt is made to show that in Boucher v. Van-
buskirk there was no consideration for the option. Whether this is
so or not, and from the report of Boucher v. Vanbuskirk it is some-
what difficult to decide, the basis of the decision was .the optional char-
acter of the right to purchase, and the fact that the plaintiff did not
prove that he had irrevocably chaiged his position on the faith of the
defendant's promise. Nothing in the report of the opinion in the case
is said about any lack of consideration for the option. The recent
cases, therefore, repudiate the basis of the decision of the earlier case
even if they do not directly overrule it.
'Stansbury v. Fringer, ii Gill. & John. i49.
=4 Gill. 472, 1846.
' B. had agreed to allow A. to dig for ore on his, B's, land. A. was
to pay B. a certain sum per ton as royalty on every ton mined. A. was
under no obligation to mine any ore, and he had not given any con-
sideration for the agreement. A. did not signify his intention to dig
for ore. B. assigned his rights in the land to C. A. sought an injunc-
tion to restrain C. from digging for ore. As the agreement between
A. and B. was without consideration, B. could terminate it at any time.
His assignment of the land had the same effect as a formal termination
of the agreement. There was, therefore, no ground on which A. could
restrain C.
=i Md. Ch. 13, 1847.
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old idea of lack of mutuality in the words of Lord Redes-
dale. The case is similar to the one on which the court
relied, except that there was a consideration for the option.
Reversing, however, their action in the previous case, they
make one of the grounds of their decision the failure of the
consideration. Therefore, while both cases contain an
opinion that the court will not enforce contracts containihg
an option, neither case can be considered as standing unques-
tionably for that proposition. The case of Rider v. Gray,
26
did however directly involve the question. There the plaintiff
had given $io,ooo for an option to dig ore on the defendant's
land and specific performance was denied. The court do
not directlyquote from Lawrenson v.Butler, but they employ,
in dealing with the defence of lack of mutuality, the lan-
guage of that case, citing Geiger v. Green, as if the language
had been their original.27 In Gelston v. Sigmund,28 the
court, this time quoting directly from Lawrenson v.Buter,
29
go so far as to intimate that an option to renew in a lease will
not be enforced. There was, however, in the case before
them, too much uncertainty as to the terms of the option,
for specific performance to have been granted in any juris-
diction, and in the later case of Maughlin v. Perry3 the
court reaffirm their first decision in Stansbury v. Fringer,
and grant specific performance to the holder of such an
option. As far as the writer is aware, Rider v. Gray has
never been reversed. It may, therefore, be presumed that
in Maryland the holder of an option in a lease can maintain
a bill for specific performance, but that ordinarily holders of
options can probably not obtain equitable relief. In other
words, that the law in the State is as it was in England in
the first part of the eighteenth century.
In Pennsylvania, the case of Bodine v. Glading,31. intro-
ducing the idea of lack of mutuality in the obligation as a
defence in specific performance, though the case had nothing
28 i0 Md. 282, 1856.
"Page 285.
"27 Md. 334, 1867.
"See page 344.
"35 Md. 352, 1871.
"21 Pa. 50, 1853.
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to do with the enforcement of contracts containing an option,
threw for the time being some doubt on the law of the state
relating to that subject. The first Pennsylvania cases deal-
ing with optional contracts had introduced an idea not here-
tofore met with. Kerr v. Day3 2 was a suit in ejectment
against a lessee with an option to purchaseby the assignee
of the lessor. The question discussed is whether the option
gave the lessee an interest in the land, or merely a personal
claim against the lessor. The court held that an option in
a lease was an interest in the land, thereby reflecting the early
English attitude towards options to renew. Two years after
this decision, in Elder v. Robinson3 3 it was held that where
a lessor covenanted in a lease, that if he offered the land for
sale, the first offer should be made to the lessee, that the
lessee acquired "no title or interest in the land." As in
Kerr v. Day, the question of lack of mutuality was not dis-
cussed.34  In the following year Bodine v..Glading came
before the Supreme Court of the state. As stated, the con-
tract in that case was not a contract containing an option.
The facts presented the same point as that adjudicated by
Lord Redesdale in Lawrenson v. Butler. B. bought A.'s land
at auction. The terms of the sale were, .that the purchaser
should pay within fifteen days, or the land should be resold
at the risk of the purchaser. B. refused to take the land or
pay the money on account of an alleged defect in the title.
As the court regard the objection to the title as untenable,
we may regard B. as having broken his contract. A.,
instead of reselling the land, brought a bill against B. for
specific performance. The court affirmed the decree below
dismissing the bill, on the ground of lack of mutuality,
because the fifteen days having passed, B. had not, under the
terms of the agreement, any right to thb land. As in the
Irish case, owing to his own default the defendant could not
have had specific performance, therefore, it is held that the
plaintiff, who is not in default, cannot have specific perform-
ance, because of lack of mutuality in the obligation. The
n 14 Pa. 112, i85o.
U 19 Pa. 364, 1852.
' On the idea that these options are interests in the land, compare
Laffen v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 662, 1858, contra.
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court use the language of Lord Redesdale, citing that case,
and also refer to Newlin on Contracts. 35 Though this case
introduced considerable confusion into the decisions of the
state, under the Statute of Frauds,3 1 its effect on the ques-
tion of the enforcement of contracts containing an option,
was terminated by the case of Corson v. Mzdvany,37 where,
after an elaborate and careful opinion, specific performance
was granted to a plaintiff who held an option to purchase
land.3s This decision has since been reaffirmed.39
Two other states, Maine and Michigan, show the influence
of the old idea of lack of mutuality by casting a doubt on the
ability of a court of equity, to enforce contracts containing
an option. In Snell v. Mitchell,40 the plaintiff apparently
held an option based on a consideration to purchase a one-
half interest in certain land. There are six reasons men-
tioned by the court for refusing specific performance. One
of these is that: "One of the parties could be compelled to
sell, but the other could not be compelled to buy." This
admission being "sufficient to withhold a decree for specific
performance."
'4 1
In Michigan, in the case of Maynard v. Brown,42 optional
contracts are declared to be lacking in mutuality and not
enforceable. 43 It is doubtful whether the so-called option in
the case was given by the defendant for a consideration.
' See page 53.
"This subject I hope to take up in a subsequent paper.
"49 Pa. 88, 1865.
See, however, the language in Philips v. Mining Co., 7 Phila. 61g
(Pa. C. C.), 1870.
"Smith's App., 68 Pa. 474, 1871.
"65 Me. 48, 1876.
No authorities are cited for the statement. In this case, therefore,
we are unable to trace the influence of Lord Redesdale. As far as the
writer can ascertain, this is the only reported decision in the state
involving options to purchase. There are a number of cases involving
specific performance of sales of land where the vendor has given a
bond. The bond, however, seems always to contain a recital of a
bilateral contract to convey.
241 Mich. 298, 1879.
"' The opinion and report are not very satisfactory, the whole case
being little over a page long. The counsel for the defendant use the
case of Benedict v. Lynch.
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Rut from the language used by the court we may conclude
that there would appear to be no doubt that they would not
enforce a contract containing an option. This conclusion
is strengthened by the use made of the case by Judge Cooley
in Rust v. Conard.44  Citing Maynard v. Brown, 45 he says:
"If, for example, the contract is so drawn that the vendor
has the option to retain the property or to convey it, per-
formance in his behalf will be refused."
The effect of the ideas of the eighteenth century in
defeating specific performance of contracts where the plain-
tiff had an option is limited, as far as the writer is aware,
to the jurisdictions discussed, and the cases cited. Though
courts have often acknowledged that the subject of mutuality
is not clear, the preponderating tendency has been, not to
allow the defence to interfere with the enforcement of
"optional contracts." Thus, there have been a number of
cases in which the lessee has had specific performance of his
option to purchase.4 Covenants in leases to renew the lease
for another term are, as has been stated, rare in this country,
but there is no reason to suppose that they would not be
44 47 Mich., page 454. This case involved the question of the right of
a plaintiff to specific performance, where, under the terms of the con-
tract, he has, and the defendant has not, the right to terminate the
contract. See article in June number on "Two Questions in Specific
Performance," supra, page 331.
Page 454.
"In re Hunter, i Ed. Ch. (N. Y.) I, 1831; Stansbury v. Fringer, ii
Gill. & John. (Md.) 149, 184o; Kerr v. Day, 14 Pa. 112, 185o; Laffen v.
Naglee, 9 Cal. 662, 1858; D'Arras v. Keyser, 26 Pa. 249, 1859; De Rutte
v. Mudrow, 16 Cal. 505, i86o; Hawralty v. Warren, 18 N. J. Eq. 124,
1866; Souffrain v. McDonald, 27 Ind. 269, 1866; Kerr v. Purdy, 5o Barb.
24 (N. Y. S. C.). 1866; Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wal. (U. S.) 557, 1869;
Hall v. Canter, 4o Cal. 63, 187o; Napier v. Darlington, 7o Pa. 64, 1871;
Maughlin v. Perry, 35 Md. 352, 1871; Clark v. Clark, 49 Cal. 586, 1875;
Schroeder v. Germeinder, IO Nev. 355, 1875; Newell's App., IOO Pa. 513,
1882; Herrinan v. Babcock, lO3 Ind. 461, 1885; Page v. Martin, 46 N. J.
Eq. 585, 18go; House v. Jackson, 32 Pa. 1027 (Ore.), 1893; Bacon v.
Kty. Cent. Ry. Co., 25 S. W. 747 (Kty.), 1894; Waters v. Bew., 29 A. 59o
(N. J. Eq.), 1894; Hayes v. O'Brien, 149 Ill. 403, 1894; McCormick v.
Stepany, 41 A. 840 (N. J. Eq.), 1898; Madison Ath. Asso. v. Brittin,
46 A. 652 (N. J. Eq.), 19oo. To the same effect the language in
McKibbin v. Brown, 14 N. J. Eq. 13, 1861.
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generally enforced.4 7  Perhaps the earliest instance in which
a court in the United States gave specific performance where
the plaintiff held an option to purchase, which option was
not in a lease, is found in the case of Lanig v. Cole.45 There
A., who was in possession of certain land, agreed to let B,
a purchaser of the land at sheriff's sale, have possession;
B. agreeing to reconvey the land to A., if within six months
A. repaid to him the money he had expended. A., through
his friends, fulfilled the condition. B. refused to reconvey,
and A. brought his bill to compel him to do so. In granting
the prayer of the plaintiff the court said: ". . . . here
was an express condition that the complainant should
deliver the possession of the property to the defendant and
put him in possession of the rents and profits. This was
done . . . and he cannot now say, after a performance
by the complainant, that there was no mutuality.49 Sub-
stantially the same facts appear in another early case, Wes-
tern Railroad Corporation v. Babcock. 0 Since these de-
cisions, though the question has not arisen in all jurisdic-
tions, there have been a number of similar cases in which
specific performance has been granted the holder of similar
options.51 In none of these cases is there any thought of
the old idea of lack of mutuality in the obligation as a de-
fence. Thus, in one of the more carefully considered cases,
Corson v. Mulvany, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
' Such a covenant was enforced in a recent case, Monekon v. Wakelin,
56 P. 735 (Ariz.), i89o.
0"4 N. J. Eq. 229, 1842.
" Page 232.
"06 Met. 346 (Mass.), 1843.
"Van Doren v. Robinson, 16 N. J. Eq. 256, 1863; Car-
son v. Milvany, 49 Pa. 88, 1865; Smith's App., 69 Pa. 474, 1871;
Estes v. Furlojtg, 59 Ill. 298, 1871; Brown v. Slee, IO3 U. S. 828, i8go;
Waterman v. Watermaan, 27 F. 8z7, i886; Bradford v. Foster, 87 Tenn.
4, 1888; Calanchini v. Branstetter, 84 Cal. 249, i89o; Ross v. Parks,
93 Ala. 153, 1890; Watts v. Kellar, 56 F. 1, 1893; Sayward v. Houghton,
19 Cal. 545, 1898; Stanton v. Singleton, 54 P. 587 (Cal.), i898; semble
Boyd v. Brown, 34 S. E. 907 (W. Va.), i899.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS.
discuss, at length, mutuality, but it is mutuality in the
remedy, and coming to the conclusion that specific perform-
ance can be had by the defendant against the plaintiff the
moment the plaintiff elects to take under the option, the
court grants the prayer of the plaintiff's bill. 52
Before leaving the subject one fact connected with many
of the cases I have used should be noted. An examination
of the notes will show that they are all cases in which the
option sought to be enforced is based on a consideration.
As I hope to show in the next paper, an agreement Without
consideration, in which one party apparently has an option,
is often regarded as a continuing offer. This tendency to
regard a nude agreement containing an option as an offer has
sometimes been carried over to contracts on a good con-
sideration containing an option. Thus, in Willard v. Tay-
loe, where an option to buy was given in a lease, Mr. Justice
Field supported the bill on the ground that the option was a
continuing offer to sell, "and being made under seal must be
regarded as made on sufficient consideration." 53 The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in one case, Napier v. Dar-
lingtol,5 4 also appear to adopt the same idea. Now, in a
number of the cases I have cited to support the statement that
specific performance will be given to the holder of an option,
though the option was in a contract based on a consideration,
the plaintiff signified his intention to exercise the option
before the contract was repudiated by the defendant. It
may be said that, in these cases, the plaintiffs, in making
their election, accepted the defendants' continuing offer, and
that the contract, which was enforced by the court, was not
the contract containing the option, but the contract which
began when the plaintiff made his election. It may be
admitted that there is some -force in the position indicated.
In many of the cases I have used, it would have made no dif-
ference in the result if the agreement containing the option
5 See also Johnson v. Trippe, 33 F. 530, 1887.
8 Wall. (U. S.), page 564.
'7o Pa. 64, 1871.
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had been a mere agreement, and not a contract based on a
consideration. But in defence of their use to support the
general proposition that optional contracts will be enforced,
it may be pointed out that in none does the court intimate
that, had the defendant attempted to-r,e pudiate the,contract
before the plaintiff elected -to -exercise 'his option, that
fact would have made any difference in the decision. On
the contrary, in those cases where the option is carefully
considered there is an express declaration that the court is
enforcing the contract entered into at the time the option
was given, and not by a fiction, a contract created at the time
the plaintiff signified his intention to take.55 The criticism
suggested, however, does not apply to all the cases cited, as
instances in which optional contracts have been enforced.
In Souffrain v. McDonald,6 and Stanton v. Singleton, 57 the
defendant had attempted to repudiate the contract before the
plaintiff made his election, yet specific performance was
granted.58  In other cases the defendant is the heir or
assignee of the party who gave the option.59 A contract
relating to land can be assigned, but an offer to sell land is
withdrawn by the sale of the land to a third person. The
court, therefore, which gave specific performance in the
cases cited in the note, could not have done so had they
See especially Hawralty v. Warren, i8 N. J. Eq. 124, 1866, page 12V;
Schroeder v. Germeinder, 1o Nev. 355, 1875, page 364.
27 Ind. 269, 1866.
54 P. 587 (Cal.), 1898.
I have placed Stanton v. Singleton, supra, as an instance of an
option in an ordinary contract of sale. In this case the plaintiff agreed
to spend $io,ooo in improving certain mining property, and was to have
an option for six months to purchase an interest therein for $5oo,ooo.
The plaintiff proceeded to develop the property and had expended $2,ooo
when the defendant notified him that he repudiated the contract. It
may be said, therefore, that there was a lease for six months, with an
option to purchase conditioned on the expenditure on the property of
$10.000.
"Kerr, 14 Pa. 112. 185o; Laffen v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 662, 1858; De Rutte
v. Mndrow, 16 Cal. 505, i86o; Van Doren v. Robinson, 16 N. J. Eq. 256,
1863; Calanchini v. Branstetter, 84 Cal. 249, 18go; Ross v. Parks, 93
Ala. 153, 189o; Hayes v. O'Brien, 149 III. 403, 1894.
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regarded the contract containing an option as a mere con-
tinuing offer to sell. The same may be said of those cases
where specific performance was given, though the plaintiff
who made the election was the heir or assignor of the
party holding the option. A mere offer cannot be assigned
by the offeree. 60
Thus, we are justified in saying that the old idea of lack of
mutuality in the obligation has no longer, except possibly in
one or two jurisdictions, any practical effect in preventing a
plaintiff, who has held an option, from having specific per-
formance. This does not mean that the effect of the intro-
duction, though Lord Redesdale's opinion in Lawrenson v.
Butler, of the early English idea of lack of mutuality is dead.
"Mutuality in the obligation as well as the remedy" is a
phrase too often repeated by the text-book writers and
courts, not to tend to have a meaning attached to it. No
sooner had it practically ceased to be effective to defeat
specific performance in optional contracts, than it was revivi-
fied to defeat specific performance in cases where the plain-
tiff holds an option to terminate the contract. As I have
discussed at length the cases involving this question in a
previous article, I shall here merely refer to some of the con-
clusions reached. 61
A contract containing an option to terminate is one where
one party has the right to consider the contract at an end,
thereby terminating his own and the other parties' obliga-
tions thereunder. An agreement between A. and B. that B.
shall work for A. for a year, in which A. reserves the right
to discharge B. at any time, or on notice, after a definite
time, is an example of a contract in which A. has an option
to terminate. Where one party holds such an option it is
impossible for the other to obtain specific performance, for,
by the terms of the agreement the defendant could terminate
the contract and render the decree of no effect. The cases
examined in the article referred to are cases in which the
C'The plaintiff was heir or assignor in Calanchini v. Branstetter, 84
Cal. 249. 189o; Sayward v. Houghton, 11g Cal. 545, 1898.
" "Two Questions in Specific Performance," June number, igoi, pages,
supra, 327 to 335 inclusive.
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holder of the option, instead of exercising his right to ter-
minate the contract, desires to go on with it, and, the other
party refusing, brings specific performance. The inability
of the court to give the defendant specific performance is
not due to any infirmity in the court of equity, but to the
agreement, which relieves the plaintiff from any obligations.
There is no lack of mutuality in the remedy. There is, on
the other hand, lack of mutuality in the obligations, though
the contract may be good at law. The two leading cases in
this country, Rust v. Conard,6 2 and Marble Company v. Rip-
ley, 3 lay emphasis on this lack of mutuality. We have
noted the assertion of Judge Cooley, in Rust v. Conard, con-
cerning the inability of a court of equity to enforce contracts
containing an option. 4 In Marble Company v. Ripley,
the court say: "When, from personal incapacity, the nature of
the contract or any other cause, a contract is incapable of be-
ing enforced against one party, that party is equally incap-
able of enforcing it against the other."" 5  This sentence is
taken from Fry on Specific Performance, section 286. The
words "nature of the contract"probably meant to that author
a case in which, from the personal nature of the acts to be
performed by one party, the Court of Equity cannot give the
other specific performance. But in view of the facts of
Marble Company v. Ripley, the sentence was probably taken
by the Supreme Court as an apt way of saying that there
must be mutuality in the obligation as well as the remedy.
The difference between the development of the ideas of
mutuality as a defence in the United States and England are
instructive. In the latter options to renew leases were so
common, and the necessity to specifically enforce the cove-
a 47 Mich. 449, i882.
io Wall. 339 (U. S.), 1870.
"The argument of counsel in Rust v. Conard, is apparently based
exclusively on lack of mutuality in the obligation, as the cases cited (see
page 450) are Bromlcy v. Jeffcries. Lawrenson v. Butler and all the
American cases expressing a similar idea of the defence which we have
just examined. The decision, however, is also based (see page 455) on
the fact, that if the plaintiff procured a decree of specific performance
he could terminate the contract and thereby nullify the court's action.
Page 359.
402 SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS.
nant of the lessor to renew so strong, that we have the devel-
opment of an idea of the defence of lack of mutuality, which
does not raise any question in regard to contracts containing
an option. With us, on the other hand, such leases were
practically unknown. Options to purchase in leases, while
not rare, were not common, and though in time the apparent
justice of granting specific performance to the holder of
such an option prevailed over the objection of lack of mutu-
ality, it was only after discussion and argument. In these
discussions no one ever doubts that lack of mutuality in the
obligation means something in equity more than the mere
defence of no contract. Perhaps this is due to the tendency,
often observed in the courts of new countries, to presume
without question that some book published in the mother-
country, or some pre-eminently great judge in their own,
correctly expresses the law. Newlin on Contracts and
Chancellor Kent said that there must be mutuality in the
obligation, therefore every judge who happened to see the
expression repeated the phrase. As a result we have a rule
of law constantly reiterated which no one quite understands,
but which always tends to have some definite meaning. It
does not apply to contracts containing an option, but will
defeat a plaintiff who holds an option to terminate the con-
tract. In subsequent papers I hope to take up other appli-
cations and attempted applications of the defence of lack of
mutuality. We will then see that the comparative clearness
of modern English decisions and the obscurity which sur-
rounds many of the American cases are due to the fact that
in England the defence of lack of mutuality is confined to
lack of mutuality in the remedy, while with us there is added
to this conception the more or less indefinite idea of lack of
mutuality in the obligation. It is first necessary, however,
that the subject of the specific performance of optional con-
tracts should be completed. I have purposely excluded from
this and the previous paper all cases in which the option is
not in an agreement based on a consideration. An agree-
ment which has not a consideration to support it may be
a formal contract, that is, an agreement under seal, or it may
be without consideration or seal, a mere nude act. Cases
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involving options contained in either one of the agreements
referred to, and the questions raised by such cases, as far as
they relate to the question of specific performance and the
defence of lack of mutuality, I hope to take up in the next,
or fourth paper. 6
William Draper Lewis.
"Note on the Consideration Necessary to Support a Contract
Containing an Option. i
What is a sufficient consideration to support a contract containing
an option is a question of contracts, not of the specific performance of
contracts. No greater consideration should be required to support such.
a contract which a court is asked to enforce specifically, than any other
contract. In the cases to which we are about to refer, the plaikntiff
held an option; he wanted specific performance of the defendant's
promises, and the court discussed the question of consideration.
In Waterman v. Waterman, 27 F. 827, 1886, a consideration of' one
dollar is considered sufficient. See contra Litz v. Goosling, i9 S. W.
377 (Kty.), 527, 1892, and Graybill v. Baugh, 17 S. E. 558 (Va.), "I893.
In this last case the court point out that the one dollar was not paid.
See further Potts v. Whitehead, 2o N. J. Eq. 55, 1869. The last case,
however, does not directly involve the point.
In Davis v. Petty, 48 S. V. 944 (Mo.), i898, there was an agree-
ment to sell one tract of land in which the vendor gave the vendee am
option to buy another tract. The option was held to be without con-
sideration. This seems a singular decision.
